Research
Regional Biocontainment Lab

News

• Safety breaches at UK labs handling lethal viruses
• White House to Cut Funding for Risky Biological Study
• Lax U.S. Guidelines on Ebola Led to Poor Hospital Training, Experts Say
• UTMB Developing Ebola, Marburg Drugs
• CDC Progress on Laboratory Safety
• U.S. CDC lab inspectors may have risked public safety: documents
• More voices call for action on lab biosafety
• C.D.C. Says Lab Director Behind Anthrax Mishap Resigns - NYTimes.com
• Pathogen Mishaps Rise as Regulators Stay Clear
• West Africa Ebola outbreak total tops 1,000
• American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) Response to Recent Events at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
• CDC says it improperly sent dangerous pathogens in five incidents in past decade
• Forgotten Vials of Smallpox Found in Storage Room
• CDC Lab Determines Possible Anthrax Exposures: Staff Provided Antibiotics/Monitoring
• Note from Rutgers Environmental Health and Safety Office
  "At Rutgers University, we have strict protocols in terms of the materials that are brought outside of our containment facilities for select agents and other pathogens. Many procedures require that materials be inactivated and then downgraded from biosafety level three (BSL3) to biosafety level two (BSL2) for further processing or analysis. Before researchers can do this, they must write a standard operating procedure and explain the method by which they will remove samples from the facility. This SOP is written only after the main project has been approved by the Institutional Biosafety Committee. Before the SOP is finalize and approved, data documenting the inactivation of samples must be included with the final version of the SOP and approved by our BSL3 Risk Assessment Committee. The committee reviewing these procedures include senior researchers, laboratory administration and the biosafety officer/ Responsible Official. Additionally, every time samples are brought out of BSL3, the BSL3 Manager is notified."
• CDC: 11 biolab workers infected from 2004-10
• Airflow problems plague CDC bioterror lab
• NSABB Reverses Position on Flu Papers
• Don't censor life-saving science
• Everywhere You Look: Select Agent Pathogens
• 'Contagion' Puts a Focus on Infectious Diseases
• Bioterrorism experts condemn a move to cut reserve money 
• Bioshield Surplus Leaves Room for Transfers, CRS Says 
• New Biosecurity Rules to Target the Riskiest Pathogens 
• An alternative use
• Senators line up to oppose cuts to bioterror protection fund
• Obama Orders Select Agents To Be Ranked by Risk Level
• Optimizing The Security Of Biological Select Agents And Toxins In The US
• Biosurveillance: Efforts to Develop a National Biosurveillance Capability Need a National Strategy and a Designated Leader
• U.S. Boosts Biodefense Funding in New Budget
• Detrick public meeting 'one step' toward better relations
• Marburg vaccine proving effective
• Prince William research lab is part of effort to fight bioterrorism
• Military Intelligence ­ Detrick’s Fire and Emergency Services wins awards